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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF omo 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD 
Petitioner 
v. 
E. L. MAXWELL, Warden 
Respondent 
BRIEF FOR PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus to 
the Warden of the Ohio State Penitentiary in Columbus, where 
petitioner is now restrained pursuant to a judgment of the Court 
of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga. County, Ohio, upon a conviction 
for murder in the second degree. Petitioner has sought and obtained 
review in each of the state appellate courts available, and was denied 
certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States; the conviction 
has never been reviewed for fede.ral constitutional violations by any 
Federal Court. 
The Bill of Exceptions (transcript of the evidence), briefs 
of the parties and opinions of the Ohio Courts are before this Court; 
in order to narrow the issues here to be considered, counsel for 
" 
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petitioner and respondent have by means of stipulations drafted 
and filed certain Pre-Trial Orders (hereinafter referred to as 
PTO). The first of these outlines the procedure to be followed 
in the presentation of this petition and its issues to the Court. 
PT0-2 sets forth a short history of the case, and annexes as 
exhibits each of the opinions filed by the several courts which 
have reviewed the case. PT0-3 lists some twenty-two issues 
which arise from Sheppard 1 s petition. PT0-3A specified the 
particular federal constitutional provision to which each is sue 
relates. PT0-4 lists nine of the twenty-two issues where there 
is no dispute as to the facts, and sets forth stipulations of fact 
upon which, by agreement of counsel, the issues of law are to 
be decided unless the Court of its own motion should choose to 
look to the record for clarification. 
Insofar as is humanly possible, factual reference in the 
arguments presented will be restricted to the Pre-Trial Orders; 
reference to any record or brief, where essential, will clearly 
indicate the particular record or brief in question. 
It is noted that the legal opinions annexed to PT0-2 are 
page-numbered individually, and that such page numbers do not 
A 
-.n 
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correspond with those of the official reporters; all r~ferences 
to pages in the several opinions hereinafter made will relate to 
the pages of the Exhibits, rather than the reports. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as Pre-Trial Orders 2 and 4 result from an 
effort to distill as finely as possible the facts relevant to the 
is sues now before this Court, they are hereby incorporated by 
reference and will not be restated. References to the facts which 
appear under "Argument" will relate to the relevant PTO and page 
of that Order. 
STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
For the convenience of the Court, the is sues (listed in PT0-4) 
will be set forth immediately before the arguments relating to them, 
under the section entitled "Argument." 
•, 
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LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CASE 
Before turning to the individual arguments of law, a few 
observations concerning the legal background of this case are 
suggested as appropriate. The basic contentions of the petitioner 
disclose that he complains not only of a lack of due process of 
law in the state proceedings, such as is the ordinary basis for 
most habeas actions, but that he has been denied the equal pro-
tection of the laws as well. At the conclusion of his petition 
(para. XV(A)) Sheppard avers that he has been denied the benefit 
of standard remedies usually available in Ohio, because he had 
the misfortune to become a "cause" rather than a case, which 
circumstance impaired the general objectivity of the revjewing 
judges. 
Certain recent Supreme Court decisions solidifying the 
rules to be followed in habeas actions in the United States District 
Courts have without question spurred litigation by many confined 
state prisoners who have both the time and inclination to seek 
release by any means available, and notwithstanding the total 
absence of any meritorious claim. The resulting flood cannot 
•, 
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help but give rise to the notion that federal judges have been 
positioned as supervisors of state criminal justice; criticism 
of this state of affairs has been rumbling within the legal pro-
fession, emanating from both state appellate judges who resent 
such interference and federal judges upon whom the additional 
burden is reposed. This is both natural and understandable, 
and it is not denied that many, even a majority, of the petitions 
presented are little more than frivolous. 
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has 
apparently seen the need for some closer federal supervision 
of constitutional violations in state criminal cases, for it has 
recently provided that application for certiorari is no longer 
(if indeed it ever was) a prerequisite to a habeas petition. 
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435; 83 S. Ct. 822, 847. This 
is presumably because the number of state convictions plainly 
needing federal review is greater than the High Court can handle. 
Although legal publications and opinions find it perpetually 
fashionable to indicate a denial of certiorari by the United States 
Supreme Court as in some manner adding weight to the decision 
of a lower court, the Justices of that Court have repeatedly and 
-6-
persistently stated that such an inference is neither fair nor proper. 
One statement is that of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in this case 
{see Exhibit 5, PT0-2), wherein he says: 
"Such a denial of his petition in no wise implies 
that this Court approves the decision of the Supreme Court 
of Ohio. It means and means only that for one reason or 
another this case did not commend itself to at least four 
members of the court as falling within those considerations 
which should lead this Court to exercise its discretion in 
reviewing a lower court's decision. " 
One may infer, without stretching the point, that between these 
lines lay a tacit invitation to seek federal review in another forum; 
now, nearly eight years and much litigation later, petitioner is 
finally in a position to obtain that review. 
That the Sheppard case is unusual and bizarre - even unique -
is a matter of common knowledge across the nation, in both lay and 
legal circles, and especially in Ohio, the state of its birth and growth. 
It has attracted the attention, and sometimes participation, of 
nationally famous people; it has spawned a book {"The Sheppard 
Murder Case" by Paul Holmes, David McKay Co., New York, 
1961) wherein a reporter-attorney concludes, after a recitation 
of the facts which religiously follows the trial record, that the 
"whole business rubbed luster from American jurisprudence .. II 
•, 
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It has given rise to one of the most remarkable opinions 
in the annals of legal history, wherein a divided court reached 
wholly anomalous results. The majority of the Ohio Supreme 
Court affirmed the conviction after conceding that petitioner had 
stood trial for his life in the atmosphere of a 11 Roman holiday" 
for news media. The minority concluded that Sheppard had been 
proven innocent by the evidence offered by the state. Against a 
schism in legal reasoning of this magnitude, the certainty of the 
law is drawn in doubt. 
The purpose in the paragraphs above-set forth is to out-
line the framework into which this petition belongs. This is not 
a case where a shrewd jail-house lawyer has evoked some technical 
bit of legal rope with which he hopes to swing over the prison walls 
via the habeas route. Sam Sheppard takes the position, as he 
always has, that he is not guilty of the crime of which he was con-
victed; that the verdict of a jury and the rulings of several appellate 
courts notwithstanding, the procedure has misfired and the system 
has fallen upon its own flaws. It is the demonstration of these 
flaws, and why they caused the conviction of a defendant against 
whom there was inadequate legal proof, to which the following 
arguments are directed. 
A 
· . .:. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. (Issue No. I, PT0-3) Was the arraignment of petitioner on a 
capital charge in the absence of his counsel, whose pre-
sence petitioner requested which request was refused, a 
violation of his constitutional rights? 
When petitioner was arrested at the unusual hour of 10:00 P. M. 
some 26 days after the homicide of his wife had been perpetrated, he 
was taken on a warrant signed by the Chief of Police of Bay Village 
and the City Council President. (The Mayor, J. Spencer Houk, had 
disqualified himself from acting on the case because of a personal 
involvement in it.) Because he had undergone substantial police 
interrogation and scrutiny right from the outset, petitioner had 
previously retained William J. Corrigan and Arthur Petersilge as 
attorneys (they later tried the case). 
When petitioner was presented at the Bay Village City 
Hall, Gershom M. M. Barber was acting as magistrate in the 
absence of Mayor Houk. He inquired as to petitioner's plea. 
Petitioner asked to have the advice of his counsel, who had been 
notified of the arrest and were presumably enroute. This request 
'l'.,t 
Cl 
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was denied, and petitioner was told that he could confer with counsel 
in the jail. He thereafter pleaded "not guilty, " and was taken to 
confinement. (PT0-4, pp. 1-2). The charge was capital. 
It has long been established that every citize.n has an absolute 
right to the assistance of counsel at every stage of the proceedings 
in a capital case. In Powellv. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 
where this federal right was first clearly defined, it was affirmatively 
stated that the right to counsel at every stage of the proceedings 
could not be abridged. "He (the accused) requires the guiding hand 
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. 11 287 U.S., 69. 
Since this decision was handed down in 1932, subsequent decisions 
have unequivocally affirmed its broad requirements until recently 
the right to counsel, as a federal constitutional guarantee, was 
held to include not only cases capital, but all "serious" crimes. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792. 
In Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S. Ct. 1202, it 
was said that an accused in a capital case was entitled to counsel 
even while undergoing interrogation. The Court in Spano emphasized 
that the need for counsel was as great before trial as during the 
trial its elf: 
n 
, ,·. 
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"Depriving a person, formally charged with a crime, 
of counsel during the period prior to trial may be more 
damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself," 
360 u. s. ' 325. 
The Court quoted with approval the position taken by Professor 
Chaffee of Harvard, set forth in Chaffee, Documents on Fundamental 
Human Rights, Pamphlet 2 (1951-52), p. 541: "A person accused of 
crime needs a lawyer right after his arrest probably more than at 
any other time. 11 
The precise issue presently before this Court was presented 
to the Supreme Court in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S. Ct. 
157. In that case a defendant had pleaded "not guilty" to a capital 
crime without the aid of counsel. The state court had denied him 
relief because there was no showing that the defendant had in any 
way been prejudiced by pleadings in the absence of counsel. The 
Court pointed out several procedural steps which might have been 
undertaken by a lawyer at the arraignment, then concluded that no 
evidence of actual prejudice was essential to so fundamental an 
error: 
"When one pleads to a capital charge without benefit 
of counsel, we do not stop to determine whether prejudice 
resulted. Williams v. Kaiser, 323U. S. 471, 475-476; 
65S. Ct. 363, 366; 89 L. Ed. 398; House v. Mayo, 324U. S. 
42, 45-46, 65S. Ct. 517, 520, 89 L. Ed. 7 39; Uveges v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 335U.S.437, 442, 69S. Ct. 
184, 186, 93L. Ed. 127. In this case, as in those, the degree 
of prejudice can never be known. Only the presence of 
counsel could have enabled the accused to know all the 
defenses available to him and to plead intelligently. 
Reversed." 
-11-
Petitioner maintains that this decision requires that he be afforded 
a new trial, notwithstanding the fact that he was later arraigned 
in another court, this time with his counsel present. It is enough 
that at this first step in the long procedure which was to divest 
him of his liberty, petitioner was deprived of the attorney he had 
already employed, simply because of the impatience of a town 
official. 
The Court in Hamilton, supra, mentioned one or two things 
which might have been attempted at the arraignment stage had 
counsel been present. Although not essential to his claim of 
error, petitioner can similarly point to what might have been done 
had he been permitted the assistance and advise of his counsel. 
The Ohio Revised Code contains the following provision: 
11 § 2937. 02: Procedure before court or magistrate. 
When an accused is taken before a court or magistrate 
and a warrant has been returned, such court or magistrate 
shall inform him of the charge against him and of his right 
to have counsel, and with the consent of the accused may 
proceed forthwith to examine the merits of the charge. 
Upon application on behalf of the prosecution or the defense, 
and for good cause shown, the court or magistrate shall 
postpone the examination for a reasonable time, not to 
exceed ten days except by consent of both parties. The 
absence of counsel or material witnesses is a reasonable 
cause for a continuance. 11 
-12-
Thus it is seen that the very authority upon which petitioner was 
arraigned contains a specific mandate that he shall be afforded an 
opportunity to have his counsel appear for him. Of course it is 
unlikely that petitioner would have known this, and hence he did not 
assert his absolute right. He was here deprived not only of due 
process, but of the equal protection of the laws of Ohio. 
Had counsel been present, he could have undoubtedly 
challenged the validity of the warrant, for it appears that it may 
have been invalid on its face; in that event petitioner would have 
been immediately freed, and the entire proceeding might have 
followed another, necessarily more favorable, course. As was 
earlier indicated, the Mayor had withdrawn from official activity 
in the case because he was material witness. His duties were 
assumed by the President of the City Council, Gershom Barber. 
It was he who signed the warrant, denied petitioner an opportunity 
to confer with counsel, and took his plea. The source of Barber's 
authority to so act is far from clear. § 2931. 01, Revised Code, 
entitled "Definition of a magistrate," provides as follows: 
"As used in Chapters 2931. to 2953., inclusive of 
the Revised Code: 
(A) 'Magistrate' includes justices of the peace, 
police judges or justices, mayors of municipal corporations, 
and judges of other courts inferior to the court of common 
pleas. " 
-13-
There is no mention of a city council president qualifying as a 
"Magistrate," either directly or as one "acting" for a mayor. 
It is possible, perhaps even likely, that Barber had no authority 
to either cause petitioner's arrest or arraign him. These are 
matters which a lawyer might have raised. What the outcome of 
such a controversy might have been, or the extent to which 
petitioner was prejudiced, if at all, is of course immaterial. 
As was stressed in Hamilton, supra, no actual prejudice need 
be shown. Once it appears that an accused has been forced to 
plead to a capital crime without counsel, no demonstrated prejudice 
is necessary. It will be conclusively presumed. 
Accordingly, petitioner submits that he is entitled to a 
ruling that his constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments were violated, and he is illegally detained. 
II. (Issue No. 9, PT0-3) Did the ruling of the trial judge, deny-
ing petitioner his last peremptory challenge, violate petitioner's 
constitutional rights? 
The means by which the make-up of an already sworn 
jury was altered, as set forth in the stipulation supporting Issue 
No. 9 (PT0-4, p. 2), was at best unusual and worst wholly improper. 
The trial judge, with knowledge that one member of the jury already 
-14-
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impanelled was to be discharged, proceeded to the impaneling 
of alternate jurors. But the first of these, necessarily, was 
intended to function as a regular juror even as he was being 
examined and sworn. 
It is not contended that due process of law requires that 
a state allow a criminal defendant any set number of peremptory 
challenges, or, indeed, any peremptory challenges at all. Petitioner 
does contend, however, that where a state criminal justice system 
does provide that a defendant is entitled to certain peremptory challenges, 
the right is so fundamental and substantial that any abridgement thereof 
constitutes a denial of the equal protection of the laws and of due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The applicable law in the State of Ohio, with respect to 
peremptory challenges, is as follows: 
§2945. 21, Revised Code: Peremptory challenges in 
capital cases: 
11 On the impaneling of a jury in a capital case, the 
state and the defendant, if there is only one defendant, may 
each peremptorily challenge six of the jurors, which 
challenges shall be exercised alternately. If there is more 
than one defendant, each defendant may peremptorily challenge 
six of the jurors, and the state may peremptorily challenge a 
number equal to the combined number allowed to all the 
defendants. Neither the state nor a defendant may be de-
prived of any of the challenges, by reason of such order 
of exercising the same, or the time or manner of exercising 
the same. " 
-15-
With respect to alternate jurors, it is provided in §2313. 37 that 
" ... each party is entitled to two peremptory challenges as to 
such alternate juror. 11 
"The right of peremptory challenge is given, of course, to 
be exercised in the party's sole discretion." Frazier v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 497, 507, 69 S. Ct. 201, 206. The right is of such 
a fundamental nature that its denial will be reversible error in 
civil as well as criminal cases. In Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm 
Bldg. Corp., 331 Mass. 366, 119 N. E. 2d 169, the defendants 
were a principal and an agent. It was provided by Massachusetts 
law that each party to a civil action was entitled to two peremptory 
challenges. The trial judge viewed the two defendants as one, and 
restricted defense counsel to a total of only two challenges. In re-
versing, the Supreme Judicial Court said: 
"The right to exercise peremptory challenges gives; 
a litigant a limited opportunity of choice and allows him to 
have a juror withdrawn who, in his opinion, because of bias, 
prejudice, or some other personal characteristic, is not 
inclined with favor to look upon him or upon the nature of 
the controversy, where he lacks sufficient grounds to support 
a challenge for cause. The right is a valuable one, and 
where, as here, a party is deprived of its exercise, he has 
a just cause of complaint.'' 331Mass., 370, 169 N.E.2d, 173. 
•, 
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In Hale v. State, 72 Miss. 140, 16So. 387, the defendant contended 
on appeal that he had been denied an opportunity to question the 
prospective jurors, and hence denied an effective opportunity to 
intelligently exercise his allotted peremptory challenges. In sus-
taining these contentions the court said: 
"The office of the peremptory challenge is to protect 
the defendant against those legally competent, but morally 
or otherwise unfit or unreliable, to try the particular case; 
and to deny a full and fair examination of a juror in order 
to wisely exercise the peremptory challenge would be 
practically to nullify the right; for of what avail would a 
peremptory challenge be if exercised at random or blindly 
and without reason? The right to peremptory challenge is 
the last precious safeguard of a fair trial left to one before 
he puts life and liberty in the hands of sworn trio rs. It is 
not enough that a court, able and impartial, has pronounced 
the 12 (sic) competent and qualified, to pass upon the awful 
is sue involving life or death. It is not enough, even after 
this, that the defendant may further challenge any of the 
competent 12 for cause. It is only enough when he has been 
permitted to challenge peremptorily, within the limits of 
the law, when, in his judgment, it is expedient or advisable 
to do so." 72 Miss., 149, 16So., 389. 
In Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 14 S. Ct. 410, the Court 
described the right of peremptory challenge in the following terms: 
''The right to challenge a given number of jurors 
without showing cause is one of the most important of the 
rights secured to the accused. 'The end of challenge, 1 
says Coke, 'is to have an indifferent trial, and which is 
required by law; and to bar the party indicted of his law-
ful challenge is to bar him of a principal matter concern-
ing his trial. 1 3 Co. Inst. 27, c. 2. He may, if he chooses, 
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peremptorily challenge 'on his own dislike, without showing 
any cause. 1 He may exercise that right without reason or 
for no reason, arbitrarily and capriciously. Co. Litt. 156b; 
4 Bl. Comm. 353; Lewis v. U.S., 146 U.S. 370, 13 S. Ct. 
136. Any system for the impaneling of a jury that prevents 
or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise by the accused 
of that right must be condemned;" 151 U.S. , 408 14 S. Ct. 414. 
In Hayes v. State of Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 7S. Ct. 350, the defendant 
sought to have declared unconstitutional a Missouri statute providing 
that in capital cases the prosecution should have eight peremptory 
challenges, except that in cities with a population exceeding 100, 000 
persons the prosecution should be entitled to fifteen such challenges. 
The conviction was affirmed. The Court in discussing the right of 
peremptory challenge used the following language: 
"Experience has shown that one of the most effective 
means to free a jury-box from men unfit to be there is the 
exercise of the peremptory challenge. 11 120 U.S., 70 7S. Ct. 351. 
"The fourteenth amendment to the constitution of 
the United States does not prohibit legislation which is 
limited either in the objects to which it is directed, or by 
the territory within which it is to operate. It merely requires 
that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated 
alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the 
privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed." 120 U.S. 
71, 7S. Ct. 352 (Emphasis supplied). 
Thus it is clear that if Sheppard has been denied a right conferred 
upon Ohio citizens by Ohio law, he has been denied the equal protection 
of the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 
-18-
Upon facts strikingly similar to those at bar, California 
has held it to be fundamental and reversible error to deprive an 
accused of his full right of peremptory challenge. In People v. Diaz, 
105 Cal. App. 690, 234 P. Zd 300, the defendant was on trial for 
murder for the third time, there having been two prior reversals 
of earlier convictions. The applicable law provided that the de-
fendant was entitled to twenty peremptory challenges, and one 
additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror. Because 
of a procedural mixup, defendant used a challenge on an alternate 
juror before the regular jury was complete; he was thus limited to 
twenty challenges in all even though thirteen jurors (one alternate) 
were impaneled. The conviction was reversed, with the observation 
that: 
"The denial of the right of peremptory challenge 
cannot be said to be a mere matter of procedure. The 
right is absolute. >:< >:< >:< The right may not be abridged or 
denied. Arbitrary abridgment or denial of the right runs 
counter to principles vital to the integrity and maintenance 
of the system of a constitutional. right to trial by jury. " 
105 Cal. App., 696, 697, 234 'P. Zd, 304. 
The question must therefore resolve its elf upon a determination 
as to whether or not petitioner was in fact deprived of an opportunity 
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to exercise a statutorily-conferred right to challenge a juror peremptorily. 
There is no dispute that the defense had one unused challenge of the six 
to which it was entitled. And it is agreed between the parties to this 
action that before the jury of twelve was sworn the trial judge knew 
that one of their number would be replaced. Had he dealt with the 
Manning disqualification before swearing the jury, defendant would 
without question have been entitled to exercise his remaining peremptory 
challenge on Juror Hansen when he was placed in the twelfth seat. 
Had the judge removed Manning after the jury was sworn and before 
any alternates were impaneled, when he first knew of the impending 
difficulty, the entire jury would have thereafter been discharged and 
a new one impaneled. But the judge did neither of these things. In-
stead, he took advantage of § 2945. 29, Revised Code, which provides 
that: 
"If before the conclusion of the trial a juror becomes 
sick, or for other reason is unable to perform his duty, the 
court may order him discharged. In that case if alternate 
jurors have been selected, one of them shall be designated 
to take the place of the juror so dis charged >!< >!< ':'." 
The framers of this statute obviously contemplated a situation where 
a trial in progress might be interrupted by the sudden incapacity of 
one of the regular jurors. In that event it would of course be im-
" 
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possible to impanel a new juror who had not heard the evidence 
already presented, and the substitution of an alternate would be 
more reasonable. However, this was not the situation here. 
When juror Hansen was being seated as the first alternate, 
the trial court then and there knew that he was actually being im-
paneled not as an alternate, but to deliberate as juror twelve on 
the regular panel. The defense was not informed of this fact by 
the court, although the press was already predicting the action to 
be taken. Consider then, even if the court had for the record 
stated what it intended to do, what the defense might have done. 
It is true that the defense might have used one of its alternate 
challenges to eliminate Hansen when he was first presented; the 
defense might likewise have eliminated other alternate jurors until 
four challanges had been exhausted. This would not in any way have 
diminished its absolute right to excuse a total of six jurors on the 
regular panel. Had the challenge against Hansen after the substitution 
been allowed, as it should have been, the second alternate would 
have been seated and the defense would have exhausted its six 
challenges. The court could thereafter have impaneled additional 
alternates, allowing the defense two additional challenges for each 
alternate impaneled. §2313. 37, Revised Code, does not restrict 
the number of alternates who may be used in a given case. 
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Instead the court ruled in such a way as to effectively deny 
to petitioner an opportunity to exercise a challenge, to which he 
was lawfully entitled, against a regular juror. In disposing of this 
as signed error in his memorandum opinion following the verdict, 
the court said: 
11 (8) Dismissal of Juror Manning and substitution of 
alternate Jack Hansen. This, fortunately, took place before 
the viewing of the premises, before opening statements of 
counsel and before a word of evidence. This is not stated 
as an admission that it would have constituted error if the 
problem had developed later in the proceedings. The court 
believes that the substitution was made in strict conformity 
with the provisions of law and was not erroneous in any 
sense or particular. 11 (PT0-2, Ex. 1. p. 3) 
"(9} Error in not permitting defendant to exercise a 
peremptory challenge upon such substitution. The law makes 
no provision for challenging an alternate juror except upon 
his impaneling as such alternate juror. If such a right 
existed, it could, and undoubtedly would in many cases, 
defeat the entire purpose of having an alternate juror. On 
its face, this claim is without merit. 11 (PT0-2, Ex. 1, p. 4) 
The Court of Appeals overruled petitioner 1 s claim of error with 
the following observation: 
"After a jury is sworn and charged with the delivery 
of the defendant, the trial is commenced, and unused peremptory 
challenges cannot thereafter be usnd; and, where an alternate 
juror has been selected and sworn as provided by law, he must 
be seated in the place of the discharged juror by order of the 
court. 11 (PT0-2, Ex. 2, p. 15) 
r:'\ (': .: •' 
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Thus, each of these courts disposed summarily of the matter, citing 
no authority to the proposition advanced, and without any regard what-
soever to the fact that the process of jury selection was still going on 
when it became apparent that Hansen v;ould have to sit as number twelve. 
Both courts utterly failed to distinguish this case from one where a 
juror became incapacitated after the trial was under way, which 
happenstance the statute was designed to accomodate. The rights 
of the state could not in any way have been prejudiced by the allow-
ance of the sixth peremptory challenge against juror Hansen; if the 
defendant had such a right, it must be presumed that he was prejudiced 
by its abridgment, since Jack Hans en voted for a verdict of guilty. 
Curiously, neither of the parties in their briefs to the Court 
of Appeals, Supreme Court of Ohio, or Supreme Court of the United 
States seems to have mentioned the case controlling the instant 
question; further, neither the trial court not the Court of Appeals 
in passing upon that question makes mention of this case, or any case 
on the point. The Supreme Court of Ohio did not pass upon this issue 
at all. 
In Koch v. State, 32 0. S. 352, the defendant contended that 
he had been deprived of a peremptory challenge. It appears that 
two peremptory challenges were allowed to both the prosecution and 
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defense. The defendant exercised one of his peremptory challenges, 
and waived the second. The state then exercised its two peremptory 
challenges, and in so doing exhausted the special venire which had 
been called for the case. A new talesman, one George Rice, was 
called from the regular venire. The defendant sought to challenge 
Rice, and the court ruled that his challenge had been waived. In 
reversing, the Supreme Court of Ohio said that: 
"When Juror Rice was called into the panel it then 
was a new jury and the defendant having up until that time 
exercised but one of his peremptory challenges, had the legal 
right to peremptorily challenge any of the jurors. The denial 
of that right was error. 11 32 O. S., 353. 
The Koch case has not been overruled, and has been the law since 
it was decided in 1877. The effect of that decision was to recognize 
the creation of a "new" jury by substitution of a juror; applying it to 
the case at bar is not difficult; Upon the substitution of Hansen for 
Manning, the defendant should have been allovved to exercise Jus 
last peremptory challenge even if it had been "waived" when the 
original panel of twelve was sworn. 
The defendant's contention upon Isnue No. 9, therefore, is 
as follows: 
( 1) The ruling of the trial court constituted a violation of 
that provision of §2945. 21, Revised Code, that says "Neither the 
state nor a defendant rnay be deprived of any of the challenges, 
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by reason of such order of exercising the same, or the time or 
manner of exercising the same. " 
(2) The ruling of the trial court constituted a violation of 
the law of Ohio as that is enunciated by Koch v. State, supra. 
( 3) This ruling thus deprived petitioner of the equal protection 
of the laws of Ohio in violation of his federal constitutional rights. 
( 4) This ruling deprived petitioner of a right so fundamental 
to a fair trial that it abridged his right to due process of law. 
Pointer v. United States, supra. 
III. (Issue No. 10, PT0-3) Did the action of the bailiffs in permitting 
the jurors, during deliberations and without authority from the 
court, to hold telephone conversations with persons outside the 
jury room, violate petitioner 1 s constitutional rights? 
The stipulation supporting this issue (PT0-4, p. 3) discloses 
that telephone calls were in fact made by jurors to nersons outside 
the place of confinement of the jury; that the bailiffs who permitted 
these calls, without any authority so to do from the court, did not 
place the calls or make note of the parties called; did not note which 
jurors placed calls, or summarize what ear.h juror said; and, most 
important, the bailiffs, although they were sitting close by, could not 
hear what was being said to the jurors. 
G 
,.· '":' 
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The General Assembly of Ohio has sought to ensure that 
the sanctity and purity of a deliberating jury shall in no way be 
tainted by the influence of any person, either outsider or participant. 
§2945. 33, Revised Code, provides that: 
"When a cause is finally submitted the jurors must 
be kept together in a convenient place under the charge of 
an officer until they agree upon a verdict, or are dis charged 
by the court. The court may permit the jurors to separate 
during the adjournment of the court overnight, under proper 
cautions, or under supervision of an officer. Such officer 
shall not permit a communication to be made to them, nor 
make any himself except to ask if they have agreed upon a 
verdict, except by order of the court. ':' ,;, >!< 11 
§2945. 32 provides as follows: 
"When an order has been entered by the court of 
common pleas in any criminal cause, directing the jurors 
to be kept in charge of the officers of the court, the follow-
ing oath shall be administered by the clerk of the court 
of common pleas to said officers: 'You do solemly swear 
that you will, to the best of your ability, keep the persons 
sworn as jurors on this trial, from separation from each 
other; that you will not suffer any communications to be made 
to them, or any of them, orally or otherwise; that you will 
not communicate with them, or any of them, orally or other-
wise, except by order of this court, or to ask them if they 
have agreed upon their verdict, until they shall be dis charged, 
and that you will not, before they render their verdict com-
municate to any person the state of their deliberations or 
the verdict they have agreed upon so help you God. 1 Any 
officer having taken such oath wh · , qfully violates the same, 
or permits the same to be violate,;, is guilty of perjury and 
shall be imprisoned not less than one nor more than ten years. 11 
C'\ ~ . . . ' 
i .;; : ; 
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It is clear, therefore, since this was a "criminal cause, 11 that 
the bailiffs who permitted these telephone calls flagrantly violated 
a law which requires that they be punished for felony. It is equally 
clear that the legislators intended this ominous sanction as a means 
of preventing absolutely the very thing which occurred. There can 
be no doubt that in thus attempting to prevent the tinge of any ex-
trinsic influence upon the jury, the statute contemplates the pro-
tection of the rights of the litigants as its end. 
Turning to a consideration of the circumstances which pre-
vailed at the time this violation occurred, we find that there is 
every reason to believe that some actual prejudice resulted. The 
trial had lasted some nine weeks; the jurors commenced their 
deliberations on December 17, 19 54. It is conceded by all that 
there had been a great barrage of publicity prior to and during 
the trial, and it is reasonable to assume that opinions on the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant were in abundance. The Chrir.tmas 
holidays were fast approaching, and the members of the jury were 
prevented from discharging the crescendc of hustle-and-bustle pre-
parations which precedes that momentous day in most American 
families. It is no doubt correct to assume that the "loved ones" 
of the jurors (if in fact the calls were made to "loved ones" - the 
record gives us no assurance that this is the case) were anxious 
~ 
. ' ' 
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that the families be reunited as swiftly as possible. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in holding that no error had 
been shown, disposed of the issue with the following language: 
"In the situations such as those in the Adams and 
Emmert cases, it is easy to presume prejudice to the de-
fendant as a result of the conduct of the bailiff. Can the 
same be said of the conduct of the bailiffs here in permitting 
jurors, who for several days and nights had been sequestered 
and unable to see or hear from their husbands, wives, or 
children, to telephone those members of the families? We 
do not think so. There is on the contrary, every reason to 
believe that assurances of the health and welfare of their 
loved ones would tend to ease the jurors minds as to personal 
matters and make them better, more conscientious jurors. 11 
{PT0-2, Ex. 4, p. 5) 
This paragraph fairly seethes with error. The court has assumed 
that the only ones called were family relatives, although it is ad-
mitted that the bailiffs did not place the calls or hear the voices 
called. The court has assumed that the calls were made only 
after the jurors had been confined for "several days and nights," 
although the record does not disclose when the calls were made; 
it does clearly show that calls were allowed on more than one 
occasion {R. 7084). The court has assum~~-that each calling juror 
received only "assurances of health and w•.o,lh.re, 11 while at the 
same time conceding that there is no evidence as to what was said 
to each juror, a most anomalous position for a state court of last 
'. 
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resort to adopt. Further, and most significantly, it is noted that 
appearing just before the paragraph above-quoted is an excerpt 
from §2945. 33, Revised Code, relating to the duties of bailiffs 
in jury cases generally (set forth hereinabove). Conspicuously 
absent is any acknowledgement of §2945. 32 Revised Code (supra) 
which deals with criminal cases. It is possible that the court 
overlooked this section, which is much more applicable, in 
deciding the case; it is much more probable (since this precise 
section was stressed in defendant-appellant's brief on the merits) 
that citation of this section, which describes a serious felony, was 
thought to be a poor selection to repose in an opinion which all but 
commended the perpetrators of that felony. 
It will be no defense for respondent to point out that bailiff 
Francis stated (PT0-2, Ex. 4, p. 4) that he heard "not one word" 
said by the jurors about the case or the deliberations. It is not 
out of concern over what the juro2._S might say that the statute was 
enacted, for no juror could be influenced by his own statement. 
The critical factor is the textual content c1f what was said to the 
jurors, and that will never be known. This point was sought to be 
made by defense counsel while the bailiff was on the stand, but was 
summarily blocked by the court: (R. 7085) 
"Q. What it was said back to the juror you have no knowledge of? 
11 A. No. 
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"Q. And you can't say now, at this time that there wasn't 
anything said about the case of Sam Sheppard from the other 
side of the telephone, can you Mr. Francis. 
"Mr. Danaceau: Objection. 
"The Court: Objection sustained." 
Thus the state prevented what might have proved to be the only 
saving grace in the situation, as the law below set forth indicates: 
proof that there was no prejudice. 
We differ sharply with the assumptions indulged in by the 
Supreme Court of Ohio in reconstructing these events. If broad 
assumption is permissible, the rule is clear that it must operate 
in favor of the defendant (i.e., presumed prejudice) unless and 
until the contrary affirmatively appears. If we may speculate on 
what could well have been said by these unknown conversants, the 
following, in view of the attendant circumstances above set forth, 
seems far from unlikely: 
"Gee I hope you're not much longer - we still need to 
do Christmas shopping. " 
"It's pretty hard getting along here, with the children 
and all - aren't you going to finish tip soon?" 
"Why are you taking so long? .Everybody in the 
neighborhood knows he's guilty." 
''If you find him not guilty we'll be run out of town -
even the newspapers know he's no good. 11 
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Here was a jury under tremendous pres sure. The public interest 
in the Sheppard case certainly exceeded that of any case before or 
since in Cuyahoga County. Each participant must have felt himself 
in the national spotlight. The foment and turmoil necessarily bred 
into any jury faced with this environment would in and of itself be 
sufficient to cast: in doubt the objectivity and impartiality of any 
verdict resulting. The telephone conversations by the jurors, and 
the treatment of this event by the appellate courts, is but a crowning 
blow; there could be no better evidence that the might of an entire 
state somehow became aligned in an effort to obtain and hold to-
gether a criminal conviction. 
We have said that the rule in cases where there is evidence 
of communications between jurors and third parties is that the burden 
will be on the prosecution to show affirmatively that no prejudice to 
the accused has resulted. In support of this position these authorities 
are presented. 
In Mattox v. U.S., 146 U.S. 140, 145, 13 S. Ct. 50, 53, the 
following appears: 
"Private communications, possibly prejudicial, be-
tween jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or the officers 
in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, 
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at least until their harmlessness is made to appear. 11 
In Wheaton v. U.S., 133 F. 2d 522, the defendant was con-
victed of using the mails to defraud. He sought a new trial on the 
ground that a court officer had communicated with the jury during 
the deliberations. In reversing, the court said: (The District Court 
had denied a new trial) 
"The law is that communications relative to a case 
on trial between jurors, third persons, witnesses or officers 
in charge of the jury are forbidden, and if it appears that 
such communications have taken place, a presumption arises 
that they were prejudicial, but the presumption may be rebutted 
by evidence showing that the communications were harmless. 11 
133 F.2d, 527. 
In People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267, 3 N. W. 927, the mere presence 
of a court officer in the jury room, even though he did nothing but 
listen, was held sufficient to vitiate the verdict. 
In La Valley v. State, 188 Wis. 68, 205 N. W. 415, it was 
held that: 
"The influences which may be exerted on such 
occasions (communication between jurors and third parties) 
are too indefinite and varied to be the subject of disproof, 
and the only safe rule to follow in all such cases is to set 
aside the verdict. 11 188 Wisc., 80 205 N. W. 417. 
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In the case of Tarkington v. State, 72 Miss. 731, 17 So. 768, a 
jury deliberated in the courtroom. Nine persons were present during 
the deliberations, two of whom had been witnesses for the state. No 
one at any time spoke but the clerk, who at one point asked if the jury 
"were likely" to agree upon a verdict. These circumstances were 
held to constitute reversible error. 
Where evidence of communications between jurors and third 
parties is shown, the burden is upon the state to prove that no 
prejudice resulted. Rushnefsky v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. App. 433, 244 S. W. 
372; State v. Bayless, 362 Mo. 109, 240 S. W. 2d 114. 
Where the communication might have affected a juror, a 
new trial should be granted; only where it is shown that the communication 
could not have affected the juror will the verdict be sustained. Perry 
v. People, 63 Colo. 60, 163 P. 844. If there is a reasonable doubt 
as to whether the jury was affected, a new trial should be granted. 
Rhoades v. El Paso and S. W.R. R. Co., 248 S. W. 1064, 27 A. L. R. 
1048. 
In Planko v. Flintkote Co., 7 N. J. 55, 80 A. 2d 302, the 
court held that: 
"The test for determining whether a new trial will 
be granted for misconduct of jurors or intrusion of irregular 
influence is whether such matters could have a tendency to 
influence the jury in arriving at its verdict in a manner in-
consistent with legal proofs and the court's charge, and the 
test is not whether the irregular matter actually influenced 
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the result but whether it had the capacity of doing so. 11 
7 N. J., 61, 80 A. 2d, 305. 
In People v. Migliori it was held that it was error to permit jurors 
to make telephone calls while they had the case for deliberation. 
People v .. Migliori, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 361, 269 App. Div. 996. 
In State v. Cotter, 262 Wis. 168, 54 N. W. 2d 43, there was 
evidence that a bailiff had spoken to the jury during deliberations; 
however, there was no evidence of resulting prejudice. The 
Wisconsin Court reversed, saying: 
"In criminal cases it has been held for many years 
that an unauthorized communication to the jury or a member 
thereof not made in open court and a part of the record is 
ground for the granting of a new trial. The rule is shown 
in the following quotation. 'The result of adjudications on 
this subject is to the effect that all proceedings in a case 
should be open and public, and in the presence of the parties, 
whenever practicable, so as to afford them all reasonable 
opportunity to participate in the proceedings, and if they 
are dissatisfied, to take such exception as the law allows. 
The due observation of this rule has led to a disapproval 
by the courts of any act by the judge, counsel, party or stranger, 
whereby communication is had with the jury after the case is 
submitted to them, and they have retired for deliberation on 
their verdict, except it be in open court, and with due regard 
to the rights and privileges of the parties. Whenever such 
communications were had, though they were not prompted 
by improper motives, and though they may not have influenced 
the jury in arriving at their verdict, still they are generally 
treated as in themselves sufficient ground for setting aside 
the verdict rendered, for the reason that no party should 
be subjected to the burden of an inquiry before the court, 
regardless of whether or not its conduct in this respect, or 
that of its officers or that of the opposing party, has tended 
to his injury ':' ':' ':'. 11 262 Wis., 171, 54 N. W. 2d, 44. 
·. 
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In State v. Rose, 43 Wash. 2d 553, 262 P. 2d ,194, it was held that 
misconduct occurring in a felony trial would require a new trial in 
the absence of evidence showing no prejudice; and that where mis-
conduct occurred during deliberations, a new trial would be required 
even though it be established that there were no actual prejudice. 
Without belaboring further the applicable rule of law, it 
is clear that the defendant is entitled to at least a presumption of 
prejudice, barring some proof to the contrary. State v. Adams, 
141 O. S. 423, 48 N. E. 2d 861, 146 A. L. R. 509. Upon the record 
it is equally clear that such proof was never offered or provided 
by the state, and the presumption should stand. Further, thP 
circumstances are such that actual prejudice should be inferred, 
even if there were no presumption. Finally, the legislative mandate 
in Ohio is sufficiently strong to suggest that it was intended that a 
criminal defendant have absolute privacy for his jury, with the recourse 
of reversal for any impingement thereof. 
It is submitted that the facts above set forth would require a 
new trial as a matter of due process without regard to Ohio law. 
But the matter of motions for new trial is governed by statute, an 
examination of which is appropriate at this time. 
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§2945. 79, Revised Code, provides that: 
r"\ 
f' .. J 
"A new trial, after a verdict of conviction, may be 
granted on the application of the defendant for any of the 
following causes affecting materially his substantial rights: 
(A) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury, prosecuting attorney or the witnesses for the state, 
or for any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by 
which the defendant was prevented from having a fair trial; 
(B) Misconduct of the jury, prosecuting officer, or 
witness es for the state; 
(C) Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against; 
(D) That the verdict is not sustained by sufficient 
evidence or is contrary to law; but if the evidence shows that 
the defendant is not guilty of the degree of crime for which 
he was convicted, but guilty of a lesser degree thereof, or 
of a lesser crime included therein, the court may modify 
the verdict or finding accordingly, without ordering or 
granting a new trial, and pass sentence upon such verdict or 
finding as modified, provided that this power extends to any 
court to which the cause may be taken on appeal; 
(E) Error of law occurring at the trial; 
(F) When new evidence is discovered material to 
the defendant, which he could not with reasonable diligence 
have discovered and produced at the trial. When a motion 
for a new trial is made upon the ground of newly discovered 
evidence, the defendant must produce at the hearing of said 
motion in support thereof, the affidavits of the witnesses 
by whom such evidence is expected to be given, and if 
time is required by the defendant to procure such affidavits, 
the court may postpone the hearing of the motion for such length 
of time as under the circumstances of the case is reasonable. 
The prosecuting attorney may produce affidavits or other 
evidence to impeach the affidavits of such witnesses." 
§ 2945. 80, Revised Code, provides that a motion for new trial must 
be brought within one hundred and twenty days of the judgment of 
conviction. 
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§2945. 83, Revised Code, provides certain condition when a 
motion for new trial shall not be granted: 
"No motion for a new trial shall be granted or verdict 
set aside, nor shall any judgment of conviction be reversed 
in any court because of: 
(A) An inaccuracy or imperfection in the indictment, 
information, or warrant, provided that the charge is sufficient 
to fairly and reasonably inform the accused of the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him; 
(B) A variance between the allegations and the proof 
unless the accused is misled or prejudiced thereby; 
( C) The admission or rejection of any evidence against 
or for the accused unless it affirmatively appears on the record 
that the accused was or may have been prejudiced thereby; 
(D) A misdirection of the jury unless the accused was 
or may have been prejudiced thereby; 
(E) Any other cause unless it appears affirmatively 
from the record that the accused was prejucided thereby or 
was prevented from having a fair trial. 11 
We think that the action of the court officers complained of herein 
was a "misdirection of the jury" as that concept is defined by §2945. 83(D), 
and that Sheppard was entitled to a new trial as a matter of Ohio law 
if it appears that he may have been prejudiced by the telephone calls. 
It cannot be disputed that all presumptions aside, he at least may 
have been thus prejudiced since the text of the conversations is not 
known. This being the case, Ohio has again denied petitioner the 
equal protection of its laws and his restraint must be adjudged illegal. 
< • ,· 
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IV. (Issues No. 11 and 12, PT0-3) Did the action of the police, 
in seizing and holding petitioner's house, and excluding 
petitioner and his representatives from it, for the duration 
of the trial, with the concurrence of the trial court, violate 
petitioner 1 s constitutional rights? 
Was the refusal of the trial judge, as affirmed by 
the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County, to grant petitioner 
a new trial upon after-discovered evidence tending to show a 
third per son in the murder room in corroboration of petitioner's 
defense, a violation of petitioner's constitutional rights? 
Petitioner has chosen to consolidate the argument of these 
two is sues, because the harm of the former is demonstrated by the 
substance of the latter, and hence they are inexorably intermeshed. 
The stipulation supporting Is sue No. 11 is sufficiently clear 
on its face to preclude the necessity of detailed factual statement 
here. It appears, first, that petitioner was most cooperative in 
permitting the police to enjoy full access to his dwelling house with-
out their having to resort to warrants or court orders. It is equally 
apparent that this courtesy was never in the most remote sense 
reciprocated, but to the contrary. 
There are numerous cases in the reports which deal with the 
return of seized property; most of these turn upon the legality of 
the seizure, or upon the contraband nature of the res, and would 
be of little help in resolving the issue herein presented; accordingly, 
they are not cited. We believe that the facts presented here are unique, 
r:·· 
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and that any decision resulting from them must sail incharted waters; 
we rely upon principles of fairness and logic, rather than precedent, 
to demonstrate the error which was committed. 
It will be conceded that the state has a right to make a 
reasonable investigation whenever it is faced with the commission 
of a crime as horrendous as the murder of Marilyn Sheppard. And 
if there might in the ordinary case arise some question of the legal 
authority precedent to the invasion of a dwelling house, that question 
is absent here. Petitioner expressly permitted the police to enter, 
search, and look for evidence. It was not until he had been indicted 
and was facing trial, and the police had ostensibly concluded their 
investigation, that he (on August 24, 1954) most discreetly demanded 
that the Chief of Police return to him access to his home. 
The record shows that the Chief refused on the advice of 
the prosecutor. It gives no hint as to what authority enabled the 
prosecutor to withhold that access, especially in view of the fact 
that the house then belonged not to petitioner, but to his son (it had 
been owned in fee by the decedent). In any case, counsel for petitioner 
filed no formal motion prior to trial for restoration of the house, and 
it was not until the state had rested that the effort precipitated by the 
letter to Chief Eaton was renewed. 
•, 
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The murder was committed in the bedroom of petitioner 1 s 
home. That home was in the exclusive possession of the police. 
Petitioner claimed that his wife was killed by an intruder. The 
state claimed that he had killed her. If some resolution of this 
factual traverse were possible, the evidence most probably lay 
within the Sheppard home, and particularly in the murder room. 
It may well be that the need for a detailed investigation of 
the premises did not manifest itself, in view of defense counsel, 
until the state had rested. At that point it no doubt became apparent 
that many of the questions which scientific inquiry might have answered 
had been left hanging by the prosecution. Whatever the thinking 
may have been, there can be no dispute that defense counsel took 
the necessary and proper steps to enable the defense to make its 
own investigation. 
The state had rested. It had said, in effect, "We have 
proved Sam Sheppard 1 s guilt." It could hardly have had any legitimate 
objection, at that point, to a reasonable effort by the defense to con-
tradict that "proof" with its own. 
The keys to the house were brought into court by means of 
a subpoena. As the stipulation indicates, when defense counsel first 
•. 
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demanded the keys, it was expressly suggested by the court that the 
keys be produced in this precise manner. When the court discovered 
that they had been so produced, he reversed himself and ruled that 
they could not be turned over to defense counsel in any event. In 
fact, he ruled that they belonged to the police. There is no con-
ceivable authority by which this ruling may be judged proper. No 
title had passed to the prosecution or police. Their only possible 
legal entitlement to exclusive access to the house was evidentiary; 
this entitlement necessarily lapsed when the state rested its case. 
The ruling of the trial court at this point was not only arbitrary and 
unreasonable, and indicative of the general prejudice with which 
petitioner claims that he infected the entire proceeding; it was an 
unwarranted interference with the right of the defendant to investigate 
and prepare his case, a flagrant disregard of the minimum require-
ments of fairness which lie at the heart of that concept known in 
American jurisprudence as "due process of law. " 
Whether some error might be inferred from an unlawful 
seizure of this sort presents an interesting opportunity for legal 
debate; however, this question we need not approach here. That 
petitioner was actually deprived of evidence tending to exculpate 
him is manifest from the affidavit of Dr. Kirk ( PT0-4, Ex. A) 
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The affidavit of Dr. Paul Leland Kirk is presented to this 
Court in its entirety, because it represents (in the view of petitioner) 
the most positive evidence that Sheppard is probably innocent. The 
circumstances under which it was received by the trial court, and 
discarded by both the trial and reviewing courts, must be carefully 
considered in attempting to determine the legal significance of these 
rulings. 
It nrnst be remembered that this was a case based entirely 
upon evidence of a "circumstantial" nature. No witness was ever 
presented upon whose testimony petitioner could have been found 
guilty; such guilt had to be inferred from the facts and circumstances 
which the jury could have believed from the evidence presented. Be-
yond that, a special rule of proof applies to such cases, in Ohio as 
in other jurisdictions, which supplements the rule of reasonable 
doubt. That rule is described by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 
the majority opinion as follows (PT0-2, Ex. 4, p. 6): 
" ... it is conceded that the law of Ohio requires that 
the facts upon which a verdict of guilt is based must be 
established beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts so established 
must be entirely irreconcilable with any claim or theory of 
innocence and admit of no hypotheses other than the guilt of 
the accused. 11 
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Against this rule we submit the fact that a jury deliberated for nearly 
five full days before returning its verdict - there is a fair inference 
that the decision was a close one. It is also noted, as Judge Taft 
observed in his dissenting opinion, that "no effort has ever been 
made by anyone to state a set of facts and ci:rcumstances that the 
iury cimld have found fron1 the evidence and that would not only support 
;rn inference of defendant's guilt, but that it supported only an inference 
of guilt." (PT0-2, Ex. 4, p. 10). The state in its briefs argued only 
that defendant "could have" been the murderer. The Court of Appeals 
in its opinion recited no factual pattern of guilt, but suggested several 
discrepancies which might raise a reasonable doubt as to Sheppard's 
innocence, in reverse of the correct reviewing procedure. These 
"discrepancies" were viewed in quite another light by Judge Taft 
( PT0-2, Ex. 4, p. 10-11). 
The majority of the Supreme Court of Ohio purported to 
pass upon the question of sufficiency, then punted. Instead of 
looking to the evidence to determine just what proof of guilt had 
been presented, the court noted that the jury took the case under 
proper instructions and thus its verdict of guilty indicates that the 
evidence was sufficient. This was certainly a bootstraps operation 
at best; rather than discharge its own independent function of ex-
amining the proof, the appellate court bows to the jury verdict and 
" 
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conclusively presumed that such verdict shows sufficiency as a 
matter of law. 
Petitioner is not unmindful of the fact that his allegation 
of insufficiency of the evidence is a separate issue not presently 
before this Court for debate (see PT0-3, Issue No. 19). The 
references above set forth are not submitted for the purpose or 
urging a ruling on insufficiency at this time, but only to depict 
the state of the proof at the time the verdict was returned. 
Shortly after the conviction was returned, petitioner 1 s 
counsel were given the keys to the house; the police entitlement 
thereto was apparently thought to have expired when the case was 
over. Dr. Kirk was called in by petitioner 1 s counsel, and commenced 
his investigation on January 22, 1955; it lasted for four days in 
Cleveland, and some additional time back at his laboratories, where 
various chemical tests were conducted. The results of the entire 
investigation are set forth in Exhibit A, aforesaid, and any attempt 
at detailed summarization would be presumptuous. 
Dr. Kirk reconstructed the killing to an extent which the 
evidence reveals was never attempted by the state in its investigation, 
by examining the blood spatter, the velocity of the drops in various 
areas, the areas of no spatter indicating where the murderer must 
·. 
-44-
have stood, the arc necessarily described by the swinging instrument, 
etc. Of primary importance to the issue as it reaches this Court is 
Dr. Kirk's discovery that one large spot of blood on the wardrobe 
door was of a type not belonging to either Marilyn or Sam Sheppard. 
No evidence could hav.e been more crucial to the defense of the case. 
Sheppard contended from the outset that he had been attacked 
by one or more intruders, who had killed his wife. The state asserted 
that there was no adult in the house at the time of the killing other 
than the defendant. Proof of the presence of a third person \\D uld 
have necessarily changed the verdict. 
We will quickly concede that Dr. IGrk's affidavit offered 
more than a mere recitation of the factual proof his investigation had 
developed; he attempted to, and did in fact, analyze the evidence in 
the case as well as his own discoveries. In commenting upon this 
facet of the affidavit the Court of Appeals was caustic and brief: 
"In its total aspect, it is a most extraordinary and 
unusual document when related to the purposes to be served 
by it. The sole purpose of an affidavit offered to support a 
motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence is to inform the trial court of the substance of the 
evidence claimed to be newly discovered which will be presented 
at a new trial if one is granted. It is never intended as a 
method to reconsider the evidence introduced at the trial 
of the case for the purpose of impugning the soundness of 
the verdict brought by the jury. If courts permitted such 
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practices, the inherent certainty of a trial by jury would 
soon wane, and such function in our system of jurisprudence 
ultimately disintegrate and disappear. Yet a major part 
of Dr. Kirk's affidavit deals with evidence presented at the 
trial and ventures his opinions and conclusions with respect 
to it, together with a criticism of the methods of investigation 
and technical evidence presented by the prosecution. This, 
of course, was entirely beyond the scope of this instrument 
and the trial court had the indisputable right to disregard 
every particle of it, which it did. The affiant states in his 
affidavit that 'no instructions or suggestions were made to 
him as to what to find or what not to find by the attorneys 
representing the defendant. 1 We believe that Dr. Kirk could 
have spared himself much time and effort had he been told 
by the attorney for the defendant the narrow scope allowed 
him under the law for further investigation. Certainly 
much that is extraneous and redundant might have been left 
out of this affidavit. 11 (PT0-2, Ex. 3, p. 7) 
The Court fails to consider that Dr. Kirk was not an advocate hired 
to espouse the cause for the defendant; he was and is a most eminent 
criminologist, whose very business is the reconstruction and solution 
of crime. His qualifications, set out in Exhibit A (PT0-4) are 
lengthy and extensive, and would be sufficient to suggest to any 
impartial court that his conclusions and opinions might well be 
something more than wasted paper. 
Dr. Kirk no doubt presumed that his affidavit would be ex-
amined, in the first instance, by an able and impartial judge whose 
paramount interest would be a determination as to whether or not 
there had been a miscarriage of justice. Although his experience 
as a witness must have made him aware of the restrictive nature 
l,.-
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of the rules of evidence in a jury trial, he was perhaps also aware 
of the broad discretion reposed in trial judges to correct verdicts 
which are, or prove to be, factually erroneous. He had no reason 
to anticipate that a judge honestly seeking the truth would take 
offense at any help which so eminent an expert might be able to 
afford, whether it be analytical or factual. We think the excoriation 
of this witness by the Court of Appeals to have been wholly unjustified 
and chauvinistic; and if the trial judge did, as the Court of Appeals 
said, disregard utterly "every particle" of the affidavit not strictly 
devoted to some discovered fact, then the trial judge can hardly 
have approached the matter with an open mind or a disposition to 
seek the truth. 
It is anomalous that judges, expert in the law but not in 
other matters, are given an almost blanket power to 11 overrule" 
science in areas where the judges cannot possibly have expertise. 
That this power should remain in the courts is necessary to our 
judicial system, but it ought certainly to be exercised with caution 
and deference to the superior knowledge of the scientist being over-
ruled. 
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"When professors of science swear they can thus 
distinguish, it would be taking too much on themselves for 
persons who like Judges, are not adepts, to say the witness 
cannot thus distinguish, and on that ground refuse to hear 
his opinions at all. By such a source the judge would under-
take of his own sufficiency to determine how far a particular 
science, not possessed by him, can carry human knowledge, 
and to determine it in opposition to the professors in that 
science. 11 
These words, written by Chief Justice Ruffin in 1851, (State v. Clark, 
12 Ired. 154) have been echoed through the years by conscientious 
jurists. Mr. Justice Holmes once said, in a speech at Harvard 
College some seventy years ago: 
11 Learning, my learned brethren, is a very good 
thing. I should be the last to undervalue it, having done my 
share of quotation from the Year Books. But it is liable to 
lead us astray. The law, so far as it depends upon learning, 
is indeed, as it has been called, the government of the living 
by the dead. To a very considerable extent no doubt it is 
inevitable that the living should be so governed. The past 
gives us our vocabulary, and fixes the limits of our imagina-
tion; we cannot get away from it, There is, too, a peculiar 
logical pleasure in making manifest the continuity between 
what we are doing and what has been done before. But the 
present has a right to govern itself so far as it can; and it 
ought always to be remembered that historic continuity with 
the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity. 11 
"I hope the time is coming when this thought will 
bear fruit. An ideal system should draw its postulates and 
its legislative justification from science. As it is now we 
rely on tradition, or vague sentiment, or the fact that we 
never thought of any other way of doing things, as our only 
warrant for rules which we enforce with as much confidence 
as if they embodied revealed wisdom ... 11 (Speeches, Little 
Brown & Co., Boston, 1918) 
" 
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In Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 383, 37 N. W. 2d 593, 596, it 
was said that: 
"M d . o ern court procedure must embrace recognized 
modern conditions of mechanics, psychology, sociology, 
medicine, or other sciences, philosophy and history. The 
failure to do so will only serve to question the ability of the 
courts to efficiently administer justice." 
A disregard of these deferential cautions has too often reflected 
unflatteringly upon courts which have peremptorily ruled a given 
scientific principle out of existence. Thus in People v. Berkman, 
307 Ill 492, 139 N. E. 91, the Illinois Court not only rejected evidence of 
firearms identification (showing that a certain bullet was fired from a 
specific gun) given by a police expert, but ruled that such evidence 
was impossible: 
" 
be produced. 
we feel very sure that no such evidence could 
The evidence of this officer is clearly absurd. 
This jumping of the judicial gun has in the past led to more than 
one miscarriage of justice; consider, for instance, those cases 
where defendants were adjudged guilty in paternity despite exclusionary 
blood test results: Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 652, 169 P. 2d 442; 
Harding v. Harding, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 810; State v. Clark, 144 O. S. 30 5, 
58 N. E. 2d 773. It was not until 1949 (Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 
351, 369 A. 2d 670) that the law was willing to concede that even the 
jury system could not compete for accuracy with the certainty of 
blood-grouping exclusionary tests; fortunately, it is now the rule 
" 
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in virtually every jurisdiction that no jury verdict can stand against 
such evidence. 
This circumstance is most appropriate to the is sue at hand, 
because it represents the one area of scientific achievement where 
the legal process is willing to bow unequivocally, and accept "con-
elusive proof. 11 Inasmuch as Dr. Kirk's principal discovery was 
the presence of a third person in the murder room proved by blood-
grouping tests, we feel that both the trial judge and the Court of 
Appeals dismissed the significance of his affidavit much too lightly. 
If Dr. Kirk was correct in his testing, Sam Sheppard did not commit 
the murder for which he has now been incarcerated for nearly ten 
years. 
Much was made by the Court of Appeals of a lack of due 
diligence on the part of Sheppard 1 s attorneys in seeking a cc es s 
to the house for investigative purposes. Many officials came for-
ward, upon the filing of the Kirk affidavit, to assert that the in-
vestigation could have been conducted at any time upon request, 
although a police officer would of course have had to be present. 
It may be that defense counsel did not take all steps possible to 
gain reasonable access to the house, but arguments against due 
diligence ought to be completely foreclosed by the ruling of the 
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trial judge that the keys "belonged to the police, 11 This ruling was 
illegal and obstructionary. Defense counsel made a very concerted 
effort, and were frustrated arbitrarily by the court. 
Holding that a man, though probably innocent, must languish 
in jail because of lack of 11 due diligence" by his counsel would be in 
and of itself a very sorry proposition to advance in a criminal case; 
in view of the demonstrable diligence apparent on the record, this 
ruling is unconscionable, 
Defendant contends, therefore, that his constitutional rights 
were violated in this instance as follows: 
( 1) The ruling of the trial judge refusing defendant the keys 
to his own house after the state had rested its case constituted an 
unfair discrimination against him, deprived him of the effective 
right to counsel in the defense of his case, and violated his right to 
due process of law in the trial of his case. 
(2) The ruling of the trial court, and the Court of Appeals, 
in refusing to recognize evidence which would have probably resulted 
in a verdict of not guilty by the jury had it been presented to the jury, 
does not rise to the minimum standard of fairness contemplated by 
the concept of "due process of law" in that this ruling disregards 
-51-
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the probable wrongful incarceration of a citizen of the United States. 
V. (Issues No. 15 and 16, PT0-3) Did the trial judge, in permitting 
police officers to testify that petitioner had refused a lie-detector 
test, violate petitioner's constitutional rights? 
Did the trial judge, in permitting a witness named 
Houk to testify that he had taken a lie-detector test, violate 
petitioner 1 s constitutional rights? 
The stipulations of fact relating to these two issues make 
it clear that evidence was presented to the jury that ( l)petitioner had 
repeatedly refused to submit to a lie-detector test at the hands of 
the police, and (2) that J. Spencer Houk, a prosecution witness 
had been given such a test by the police. We argue these two issues 
tog ether, because of their obvious similarity. 
Before turning to the reported cases, however, we must 
observe that the first of these issues was never taken up on appeal 
in the Ohio Courts. Why this is so is difficult to understand, but 
since the chief architect of the defense is now deceased the explanation 
reposes with him, any harsh criticism would be unfair. As the law 
set forth below clearly indicates, the receipt of this evidence was 
easily the most horrendous and universally condemned error of law 
in the entire proceedings. In the history of our jurisprudence, 
there is not a single case which even suggests that refusal to submit 
·•: 
-52-
to a polygraph, or "lie-detector" test is competent evidence of 
guilt; there are many, many cases to the contrary. The law is so 
clear that we anticipate that respondent may concede the inadmissibility 
of this evidence, and argue that the failure to raise the issue (No. 15) 
in the state courts precludes its consideration here. 
There are several reasons why such a contention should 
not be sustained. First, any error involved is necessarily the 
error of Sheppard 1 s trial attorneys and not of Sheppard hims elf. 
With all due regard for the doctrine of waiver, denial of relief 
because of a serious error on the part of counsel is always an 
onerous method of procedure, and ought to be avoided except 
where circumstances fairly demand it. 
Second, the error is so grievous that a recent case has 
held it to be reversible even where no objection to the evidence is 
taken at trial. State v. Driver, infra. Third, in view of the ruling 
of the Court of Appeals on Issue No. 16, which was appealed, and 
the failure or refusal of the Ohio Supreme Court to pass upon that 
issue, it is doubtful that the result would have been changed if a 
full appeal had been taken. 
Fourth, there is no means whereby petitioner can now raise 
the issue in the Ohio Courts. His appeals are complete, the time 
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for filing a motion for new trial has long expired, habeas corpus 
is not available to raise matters which could have been raised on 
appeal, and there is no writ of error coram nobis. This is the 
only forum where a ruling can be had, and under the doctrine of 
Fay v. Noia, supra, the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies 
is met whenever there is no remedy available in state courts at 
the time the federal habeas is filed. Surely it cannot be said that 
Sheppard's failure to bring this issue up on appeal was due to laxity 
or negligence on his part; it resulted from, and only from, an error 
in judgment on the part of those who represented him at trial, when 
his rights were being preserved. 
Fifth, and last, Issue No. 16 (as to which remedies were 
fully exhausted) is so close in kind to Issue No. 15 in type and kind 
that any ruling made upon one ought to apply to the other, and hence 
the distinction, if any, as to exhaustion, should be immaterial. 
One other question may be presented by these issues, and 
that is whether or not the error, however grievous, can be said to 
comprise a violation of federal constitutional rights. We think that 
this question must be answered in the affirmative. 
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees, in essence, that 
every state must accord its citizens, in criminal cases, a "fair" 
•'. 
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trial. This broad concept has been the subject of much concern 
to our Supreme Court. The right to counsel and the use of illegally 
obtained evidence, once thought to be beyond the purview of constitutional 
protection, have since upon reconsideration been included. The criterion 
seems to be, basically, a concept of fundamental fairness; the fairness 
which is "implicit in a concept of ordered liberty. " Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149. If a man may not be 
convicted on illegally procured evidence, however probative, as 
a matter of constitutional protection, he must certainly not be con-
victed on evidence which is wholly incompetent. Any system of 
law which could overlook "evidence" of the nature hereinof complained 
would have to take a similar view of testimony of astrologists and 
witch doctors, whose opinions, grounded in the occult, might 
furnish evidence of guilt. Such were the guidelines which permitted 
the conviction and execution of Massachusetts women as "witches 11 
before we had a federal constitution; they have no place in present 
jurisprudence. 
As we shall see from the reported cases below-discussed, 
the courts have been quick to rule that evidence of refusal to submit 
to a polygraph test is presumed to be grossly prejudicial, even though 
it appear only in the form of a subtle inference. The reason for this 
position is very clear; for while the courts have consistently found 
f:""'\ 
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a lack of scientific certainty in the process of "lie-detection, 11 
the public has been given good reason to believe that the "lie-
detector actually detects lies. 
We think that as a matter of Common Knowledge this Court 
can take notice that news media frequently report that the police 
have "cleared" some suspect or other in a criminal investigation; 
or that police have obtained a confession following the failing of a 
"lie-detector" test. The instrument is something of which the public 
is very acutely aware, and although it is a much misunderstood technique 
it has worked its way into the public confidence in large measure. 
Therefore, notwithstanding judicial pronouncements to the contrary, 
people in general are most apt to attach no little significance to the 
reaction of an accused when he is faced with a lie detector test. 
This is why the courts have been adamant in inferring prejudice 
from the slightest mention of "lie-detector" during a trial. 
In a case resting upon meager and equivocal circumstantial 
evidence such as the one at bar, evidence that the "only suspect" 
refused to submit to a scientific test of veracity must have resulted 
in incalculable damage to the presumption of innocence. We think 
it vitiated the entire trial as a matter of due process. 
·. 
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Inspection of the testimony of the police officers as this 
is set forth in PT0-4, Issue No. 15, Stipulation, raises serious 
questions as to its admissibility on any grounds, without regard 
to the lie-detector question; it appears that an accusation coupled 
with a denial is evidence of some sort, or was in this case. But 
in any event, and notwithstanding the belated objection and lack of 
exception by defense counsel, the prejudicial effect of this evidence 
cannot be denied. 
It may be contended that the trial judge corrected the error 
with a curative instruction - but this is certainly not the case. He 
at no time instructed the jury that the evidence was not competent, 
or that no inference could be drawn from it; he only stated that 
defendant had no "legal obligation!' to submit to the test, which 
did not lessen to any degree the damaging implication of his re-
fusal. 
The lie detector was first offered to a court of record in a 
reported case in 1923. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 10 13. It 
was rejected as scientifically uncertain, "not generally scientifically 
accepted." Since that time well over one hundred cases have arisen 
with respect to the admissibility of polygraphic evidence, all with a 
uniform result - rejection. We will cite but a few. State v. Bohner, 
" 
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210 Wis. 651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933); People v. Forte, 279 N. Y. 
204, 18 N. E. 2d 31, ( 1938); People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 
N. W. 2d 503 ( 1942); State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S. W. 2d 43 ( 1945); 
State v. Lowry, 163 Kans. 622, 185 P. 2d 147 ( 1947); People v. Wochnick, 
98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P. 2d 70 ( 1950); Henderson v. State (Okla, Crim. 
Ct. App.) 230 P. 2d 495 ( 1951); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N. W. 2d 
593 (1949). 
At the time this case was being tried the ink was hardly dry on 
an Ohio decision ruling inadmissible lie-detector evidence. Parker 
v. Friendt. 99 Ohio App. 329, 118 N. E. 2d 216 ( 1954) 
In State v. Kolander, (Minn. 1952) 52 N. W. 2d 458, on facts 
very similar to those at bar, evidence was admitted that defendant 
had been asked if he would submit lo a lie-detector test. A motion 
to strike was denied; however, the court did instruct the jury as 
follows: 
"Of course, the jury under stands he did not have to 
take one unless he wanted to and probably no inference ad-
verse to him should be - the jury should not consider any-
thing adverse to him, the fact that he did not take it. 11 (p. 464) 
This instruction was held to be an insufficient curative measure, 
and the conviction was reversed. It is noted that the instruction 
quoted above ordered that no inference be drawn from the refusal, 
something the trial judge in this case omitted. 
~ 
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In People v. Aragon, 154 Cal. App. Zd 646, 316 P. Zd 370, 
the defendant, a boxer, was convicted of fixing a fight. There had 
been evidence that he had taken and failed a lie-detector test. The 
appellate court revers rod, saying: 
11 1£ the result of the lie-detector test is inadmissible 
in the fir st instance, surely no one WJ uld contend that the 
results can be cloaked in the raiment of an accusatory state-
ment and then slipped into evidence':' ,;, '~ We believe that 
the prosecution should not be permitted to introduce in-
directly what would be highly improper if done directly." 
154 Cal. App. 2d, 658; 316 P. 2d, 378. 
In People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P. 2d 70, a pro-
secution for murder, a polygraph examiner testified to a conversa-
tion with the defendant. Certain discrepancies on the polygrams 
were pointed out to defendant, and he was asked to explain them; his 
answer was equivocal. The conviction was reversed, on the ground 
that this in effect put before the jury an inference that defendant had 
failed the test, which was inadmissible and highly prejudicial. 
In State v. Driver (N. J, 1962) 183 A. 2d 6 5 5, the prose cu tor 
alluded in his opening statement to the fact that defendant had refused 
to submit to a lie test. No objection was taken to these remarks by 
the defense. The appellate court reversed, saying that the error 
was so horribly prejudicial that it required reversal even though 
never objected to. 
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In People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P. 2d 665, a witness 
in the case (not the defendant) who had been a suspect hims elf was 
allowed to testify that he had submitted to a lie-detector test; the 
results were not mentioned. This was held to be prejudicial error, 
permitting the jury to infer that ( 1) the suspect had passed the test 
or he would not have mentioned it, and (2) if the suspect passed it 
the defendant could not have since their testimony was in conflict. 
This is precisely the harm complained of in Issue No. 16. A 
similar result was reached in Kaminski v. State (Fla. 19 53) 63 
So. 2d 339. In that case a prosecution witness whose testimony 
had been impeached was asked on redirect if he had submitted to 
a lie test. The affirmative answer was allowed to stand, but the 
results were not given. The case was reversed on the ground that 
this was tantamount to a showing that the government witness was 
telling the truth by means of inadmissible lie tests. 
The rule is the same in Ohio. In State v. Smith, 113 Ohio App. 
461, 18 Ohio Ops. 2d 19, the accused on cross-examination admitted 
that he had taken a lie-detector test, but did not know the results. 
The receipt of this evidence was held prejudicial, tantamount to 
informing the jury that the defendant had lied during the test. The 
conviction was reversed. 
•, 
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The string of decisions on this point are too numerous to 
set forth here without unnecessary redundancy, but the rule is 
universal, not only in the state courts but the federal courts as 
well. United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 279; Szocki v. 
Cavell, 156 F. Supp. 179; United States v. Banda, 244 F. 2d 833. 
The extent to which courts will go to presume prejudice 
from the mere mention of a lie-detector in connection with a criminal 
case is apparent in the preceding cases, and in Stockwell v. State, 
(TexCrRep 1957) 301 S. W. 2d. 669. In that case the jurors had 
read a newspaper story wherein the defendant had taken a lie detector 
test and his sister had later charged that the machine was defective. 
The conviction was reversed; the reviewing court felt that an infer-
ence would arise in the mind of the reader of such a cir cum stance 
that the results of the test had been unfavorable to the defendant. 
Against this most formidable array of cases it cannot be 
seriously contended that the defendant was not highly prejudiced 
by the evidence used against him, in both its forms. The Court 
of Appeals in passing upon Issue No. 16 created the only decision 
which stands contra to the array. It said, "The results of the test 
were not inquired about, and the simple fact that a test was made 
·. 
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by agreement of the witness under the circumstances could not 
P re3'udice the defendant's case. " (PTO 2 E 3 34) 
- ' x. ' p. Every 
court, before and since, which has had occasion to pass on this 
issue has taken a directly opposite stand (including the courts of 
Ohio) as the above citations indicate. The Supreme Court of Ohio, 
of course, did not pass upon this issue although it was argued by 
brief. 
We do not suggest that this result was reached because the 
judges of these courts were incompetent or unintelligent; on the 
contrary, they are no doubt most able and conscientious jurists. 
We do contend that this is but another striking example of the lengths 
to which these courts have gone in order to hold together, by the sheer 
force of judicial statement unsupported by reason, logic, or precedent, 
a criminal conviction whose perpetuation became too important to 
the "honor" of the entire state. It is because of wholly inexplicable 
rulings such as this that petitioner has claimed that he can have no 
justice at the hands of Ohio courts. 
There is one additional facet of the "lie-detector" situation, 
inasmuch as petitioner comes to this court seeking not only strictly 
legal relief, but equitable relief as well. It is true that petitioner 
did refuse to allow police to give him a lie test; he did so on the advice 
of counsel, and after the police had informed him that they were con-
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vinced of his guilt even though they could not prove it. Obviously, 
anyone who would submit to a test by those convinced of his guilt 
would have to be out of his mind. Petitioner testified, in explanation, 
that he was always willing to submit to a test by an impartial examiner. 
(It may well be that defense counsel did not object to the evidence 
because Sheppard 1 s refusal had been blasted throughout the county 
by news media; perhaps, under the circumstances, it was tactically 
more sound to admit and explain, rather than block evidence about 
which the jurors had doubtless already heard.) 
That Sheppard was sincere in his offer to take an impartial 
test was demonstrated in 1957 when he agreed to submit to exam-
ination by a panel of eminent authorities in the prison at Columbus. 
Permission for this test was granted by then governor C. William 
O'Neill, and then at the last minute withdrawn; no reason for this 
reversal was given. (Holmes, The Sheppard Murder Case, David 
McKay Inc., New York, 1961, pp. 280-284) 
In 1961 permission for the test which the state had purported 
to so vigorously seek was requested of Governor DiSalle, and re-
fused; a subsequent mandamus proceeding in the Ohio Supreme Court 
saw that court punt once again. The court could not aid, it was ruled; 
whether or not a polygraph examiner would be allowed to enter the 
prison would be left entirely to the warden - the court could not 
intervene; there was no right to enforce. State ex rel Sheppard v. 
.. 
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Koblentz, 174 O.S, 120, 187 N.E.2d 40 (1962). With all efforts to 
demonstrate factual innocence blocked at every turn - even the lie-
detector, which the state had wrongfully used to convict him and then 
prevented him from using for his own benefit - Sheppard filed this 
petition attacking the conviction on legal grounds. It is ironic that 
these very issues should be the strongest of his petition, but an 
examination of the applicable law would seem to indicate that such 
is the case. 
The errors complained of deprived petitioner of that fundamental 
fairness required by the "due process 11 under the fourteenth amendment; 
the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which was made especially for and 
only for the Sheppard case and has never been applied in any other 
case in Ohio, together with the refusal of the £ upreme Court of Ohio 
to review and correct that ruling, constitutes a denial of the equal 
protection of the laws. The conviction must be set aside. 
VI. (Is sue No. 17, PT0-3) Did the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio, in appointing his own replacement in violation 
of the .Ohio Constitution to sit on petitioner's appeal, violate 
petitioner 1 s constitutional rights? 
It is provided in the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, 
that: 
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>!< >!< >!<If any of said Judges shall be unable, by 
reason of illness, disability or disqualification, to hear, 
consider or decide a cause or causes, the Chief Justice, 
or in case of the absence or disability of the Chief Justice, 
the Judge having the longest period of service upon that 
Court, may direct any Judge of any Court of Appeals to 
sit with the Judges of the Supreme Court in the place and 
stead of the absent Judge. 11 
As is indicated in the stipulation supporting this is sue, the Chief 
Justice disqualified himself because his son Richard had been 
connected with the prosecution of petitioner in the early stages of 
the case. He then appointed Montgomery, J., to sit in his place 
and stead. (Actually, Judge Montgomery was the second replace-
ment appointed; a Judge named Middleton had earlier been appointed, 
and had sat on the motion for leave to appeal; thus the entry shows 
that an earlier order was ''vacated. 11 ) 
We think that the plain language of the Ohio Constitution 
requires a finding that the Court which heard and decided petitioner's 
case was illegally constituted. We concede that as a general rule 
the highest court of a state is empowered to interpret its own con-
stitution, and is not subject to review on matters of state law. We 
further concede that due process does not require that any appeal 
be provided by a state, and certainly not a second appeal such as this 
was. 
r\ 
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We do contend, however, that where a state law exists it 
must be applied to all of the citizens of that state on an even basis; 
that what happened here is so plainly contradictory to the state 
constitutional requirements that petitioner was thus deprived of 
equal protection of the laws. 
It must be remembered that Richard Weygandt' s role in 
the Sheppard case was not inconsequential. The editor of the 
Cleveland Press has preserved for us, in his autobiography 
(Seltzer, The Years Were Good, World Pub. Co., Cleveland, 
1956, Ch. 26 and p. 256), the circumstances prevailing at the time 
there fell to Mr. Weygandt, as Law Director for Bay Village, the 
delicate task of determining whether there was sufficient evidence 
to justify the arrest of petitioner: 
"On July 30, the Cleveland Press published, again 
spread across the top of its first page, another editorial. 
This one was headed: 'Quit Stalling - Bring Him In. ' Once 
more I wrote it myself. It was my neck I was sticking out. 
'Maybe sornebody in this town can remember a 
parallel for it. The Press can't. 
And not even the oldest police veterans can either. 
Everybody's agreed that Sam Sheppard is the most 
unusual murder suspect ever seen around these parts. 
Except for some superficial questioning during 
Coroner Sam Gerber's inquest, he has been scot-free 
of any official grilling into the circumstances of his 
wife 1 s murder. 
From the morning of July 4, when he reported 
the killing to this moment, 26 days later, Sam Sheppard 
has not set foot in a police station. 
He has been surrounded by an iron curtain of 
protection that makes Malenkov 1 s Russian conceal-
ment amateurish. 
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Certainly, Corrigan will act to protect Sam 
Sheppard's rights. He should. 
But the people of Cuyahoga County expect you, 
the law enforcement officials, to protect the people's 
rights. 
A murder has been committed. You know who 
the chief suspect is. 
You have the obligation to question him - question 
him thoroughly and searchingly - from beginning to 
end, and not at his hospital, not at his home, not 
at some secluded spot out in the country. 
But at Police Headquarters - just as you do every 
other person suspected in a murder case. 
What the people of Cuyahoga County cannot 
understand, and the Press cannot understand, is why 
you are showing Sam Sheppard so much more consider-
ation as a murder suspect than any other person who 
has ever before been suspected in a murder case 
Why?' (op. cit., pp. 256, 273-7 5) 
That night Dr. Sam was arrested on a murder charge 
and taken to Police Headquarters. " 
We are given some picture, then, of Richard Weygandt poring over 
the evidence and exhibits, already under newspaper indictment 
for criminal conspiracy to obstruct justice because he, as a Bay 
Village "official, " was thought to be one of those "protecting" 
petitioner. He did determine the evidence to be sufficient (one wonders 
how in the world he, or any other individual in his position, would 
have dared to do otherwise). On that evidence Sheppard was indicted 
and put to trial. Its sufficiency was a hotly contested question in 
all the courts. A reversal for insufficiency of evidence would at 
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His family, his Bay Village friends - which 
include its officials - his lawyers, his hospital 
staff, have combined to make law enforcement 
in this County look silly. 
The longer they can stall bringing Sam Sheppard 
to the police station the more surer (sic) it is he 1ll 
never get there. 
The longer they can string this whole affair out 
the surer it is that the public 1 s attention, sooner 
or later, will be diverted to something else, and then 
the heat will be off, the public interest gone, and the 
goose will hang high. 
This man is a suspect in his wife 1 s murder. No-
body yet has found a solitary trace of the presence 
of anybody else in the Lake Road house the night 
or the morning his wife was brutally beaten to death 
in her bedroom. 
And yet, no murder suspect in the history of this 
County has been treated so tenderly, with such in-
finite solicitude for his emotions, with such fear of 
upsetting the young man. 
Gentlemen of Bay Village, Cuyahoga County, 
and Cleveland, charged jointly with law enforcement 
This is murder. This is no parlor game. This 
is no time to permit anybody - no matter who he is -
to outwit, stall, fake or improvise devices to keep 
away from the police or from the questioning any-
body in his right mind knows a murder suspect 
should be subjected to - at a police station. 
The officials throw up their hands in horror at 
the thought of bringing Sam Sheppard to a police 
questioning for grilling. Why? Why is he any 
different than anybody else in any other murder 
case? 
Why should the police officials be afraid of 
Bill Corrigan, his lawyer? Or anybody else, for 
that matter, when they are at their sworn business 
of solving a murder? 
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best reflect adversely on Richard Weygandt as a lawyer, and at worst 
leave him open to a charge of being derelict in his duty as Law 
Director, exposing him to civil damages for malicious prosecution. 
In l~ght of these circumstances, can it be said that Richard's 
father, as Chief Justice, was in any position to exert even the 
slightest influence on the case? However subconscious the notion 
might be, it is fair to infer (without casting any stones) that Chief 
Justice Weygandt had some desire to see Richard's determination 
of law receive the final, and most critical, endorsement of the 
state 1 s highest court. This being the case there could indeed have 
been some inclination, again perhaps subconscious, to select a 
replacement Judge whose juridicial philosophy was known to lean 
in a given direction. 
It is not as though the language of the constitutional provision 
left room for some interpretation, for its command is plain and 
unequivocal. It must be presumed that a Chief Justice is familiar 
with the constitution which it is his duty to follow, and hence the 
appointment could only have been made with the knowledge in mind 
that the constitution required otherwise. This we regard as a 
sufficiently clear error to require correction by a federal court 
under the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. 
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It is well-recognized jurisprudential principle that con-
stitutions, expressing the sovereign will, may not be contravened 
by the executive, the legislative, or the judiciary. It is of course 
the judiciary which determines, in the final analysis, what certain 
constitutional provision may mean, and in view of this interpretive 
role it is somewhat paradoxical to say that the judiciary is bound 
by the constitution - and yet it cannot be denied that this is certainly 
the case. While the interpretive power is both broad and deep, 
it is not limitless; plain language is plain language. 
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Marshall, 124 Tex. 45, 
76 S, W, 1007, 96 A. L. R. 802, a suit had been brought. The de-
fendant sought an injunction to halt the suit, citing a Texas statute 
barring collection suits in emergency situations caused by economic 
depression. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the 
statute as conflicting with the contract clause of the Texas con-
stitution. The Texas court said: 
11 Neither the legislature, executive officers, nor the 
judiciary can lawfully act beyond the limits of this constitution. ':' ':' ,;, 
Necessity that is higher than the constitution can safely have 
no place in American Jurisprudence. That principle is 
necessarily vicious in its tendency, and subversive of the 
constitution. It should be, and is, limited by constitutional 
inhibitions. 11 124 Tex 51, 76 S. W. 1009, 96 A. L. R. 806. 
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The statute barring suit was declared void. 
In People ex rel Sammons v. Snow, 340 Ill. 464, 173 N. E. 8, 
a defendant awaiting trial was denied bail because of his long criminal 
record. He brought habeas corpus, and the Supreme Court of Illinois 
ruled that his constitutional entitlement to bail in a non- capital case 
was absolute: 
"The constitutional right to be admitted to bail 
cannot be disregarded. The judge has no more right to 
disregard and violate the constitution than a criminal has 
to violate the law. 11 
In State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 7 89, the defendant 
was convicted on evidence illegally secured, in violation of the U.S. 
Constitution. In reversing, the Idaho Court said: 
"Law and Court-made rules of expediency must not 
be placed above the constitution >:< >:< >:<A continued disregard 
of the rights guaranteed under the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments, and the principles thereof incorporated into the state 
constitutions, leads us directly to revolution against their 
usurpation. 11 44 Idaho 57, 254 P. 792. 
In 21 C. J. S. 259, Courts, § 168, the following appears relative to 
the power of an officer of the judiciary to designate a replacement 
judge: 
"However, an order of assignment is unsufficient in 
itself to confer jurisdiction where the chief justice or other 
officer making it is without power to do so ':' >:< >:< 11 To be valid, 
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statutes relating to the assignment or detailing of judges 
to certain courts, or to the judges or judicial officers who 
may preside over such courts and sit for the trial of causes 
therein, must, of course, not contravene constitutional pro-
visions." 
Petitioner says, then, in sum, that Chief Justice Weygandt did not 
have the power to make a valid appointment of a replacement, be-
cause it was expressly denied him by the Ohio Constitution; that 
Judge Montgomery was improperly permitted to vote in the decision 
of the case, and that his unlawful participation vitiates the judgment 
of the Ohio Supreme Court. That judgment being void, petitioner 
is entitled to his freedom notwithstanding the power of the Ohio 
Supreme Court to rehear and determine the case. 
VII. (Issue No. 20, PT0-3) Did the Supreme Court of Ohio, in 
failing to pass upon all of the errors assigned by petitioner 
in his appeal, as required by Ohio Statutes, violate petitioner 1 s 
constitutional rights? 
The position taken with respect to this claim of error is 
similar to that of the previous assignment; although the Supreme 
Court of Ohio had no duty to allow petitioner 1 s appeal to be heard, 
having granted the right to be heard the court was bound by Ohio 
law to treat petitioner equally, observing the statutes providing for 
such review. 
r-1 
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As was correctly pointed out by Judge Taft in his dissenting 
opinion (PT0-2, Ex. 4, p. 7), only assignments of error not argued 
by brief may be disregarded by the Supreme Court. §2505. 21 Revised 
Code. The petitioner assigned 29 errors of law in his brief, and 
argued each; the majority passed on only three of these, which 
were "stressed in oral argument. 11 (PT0-2, Ex. 4, p. 2) By what 
authority were the remaining 26 d,isTegal:n'ded? 
The majority purported to pass on ( 1) the excessive publicity, 
(2) the phone calls by the deliberating jurors, and ( 3) the sufficiency 
of the evidence. The opinion concludes by declaring: 
"We have carefully examined the other errors 
as signed and find none, either in the admission or re-
jection of evidence or the instructions of the court, prejudicial 
to the defendant. 11 
In the fir st place, we feel that the court did not judicially determine 
even the three questions it discussed, at least not in accordance 
with any known method of judicial review. With respect to the 
publicity, it merely extolled the virtues of the jury systern and 
the discretion of the trial judge; it made no comment whatsoever 
on the horribly prejudicial and damning front-page editorials such 
as the one quoted in Section VI, supra. It paid no heed to the inad-
missible evidence proven through news media, the publication of 
,..,,\ 
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the jury list thirty days before trial, the prejudicial broadcasts 
of Walter Winchell and Bob Considine, or the refusal of the trial 
judge to investigate their prejudicial effect by questioning the jurors. 
All of these things were fairly shouted at the court in petitioner's 
brief, but evidently not thought to be worthy of consideration or 
mention. 
As to the phone calls, the majority sirn.ply reversed the 
rule previously established (State v. Adams, supra,), whereby 
phone communications are presumed prejudicial until the contrary 
is shown, and with no evidence whatever to go on issued broad assumptions 
of no prejudice. This view of the issue in question has never been 
followed before or since; it remains as one of the "special'' rules 
of law which was made by and for the Sheppard case, and that case 
only. 
The is sue of sufficiency was never passed on at all, although 
the court purported to review this question. There was no mention 
of the evidence which justified the submission of an is sue of fact to 
the jury, no recitation of the facts and circumstances which the 
jury could have found that were legally sufficient to comprise proof 
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in a circumstantial criminal case. This issue was summarily disposed 
of through a presumption of some sort that the jury, having been properly 
instructed, must have been properly convinced of guilt. Thus the 
final arbiter of sufficiency in petitioner's case was not the Supreme 
Court of Ohio, but the jury; a most unusual procedure, to say the 
least! 
Those assignments of error which the court said it had "care-
fully examined" and found to be lacking in prejudicial effect are of 
some consequence at this point, for if this is true the court has, 
however summarily, accorded petitioner at least some review. 
There was no mention of the Houk lie-test evidence, although 
an examination of authorities in 1956 (when this opinion was written) 
would have revealed the same universality of judicial rule that is 
demonstrated by Section V, above. One might well expect that a 
Supreme Court, if it did intend to rule that such evidence was not 
prejudicial and thus create a contrary rule, might at least give 
the world a glimpse of the rationale which had led to this singular 
stand. And it is manifest from cases subsequently decided (State v. 
Smith, supra, 1960) that this is not the law of Ohio and that inferior 
appellate courts in that state do not recognize it as such. There seems 
to be some implicit understanding that the Sheppard case is unique, 
and therefore not general precedent to be fitted into the framework 
\ 
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of "stare decisis. 11 
There was evidence, as the dissent loudly complained, that 
Nancy Ahern was told by Marilyn Sheppard that Marilyn had been 
told by a Dr. Chapman that Dr. Chapman had been told by Sam 
Sheppard that Sam was thinking about a divorce. This evidence, 
in the form of testimony by Nancy Ahern, was admitted over objection. 
The Court of Appeals, in passing upon this claim of error, said: 
"Statements such as were given in evidence or 
testified to by Mrs. Ahern as a statement by the decedent 
are always admissible to show that the statement was made 
or to establish the state of mind of the parties where their 
relationship is material to the issues of the case. 11 (PT0-2, 
Ex. 2, p. 33) 
It is not the purpose of thiB brief to impugn the intelligence of 
the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County, but no person with even 
a rudimentary knowledge of the rules of evidence can help but gag 
over this ruling - a ruling which the Supreme Court "carefully ex-
amined" and found to be less than prejudicial. 
Analysis reveals that: 
( 1) If Dr. Chapman had testified as to a statement 
made by the defendant, this evidence would have been 
competent as an admission by a party to the litigation. 
(2) If Marilyn had testified to what Dr. Chapman 
told her Sam had said, this would have been pure and un-
adulterated hearsay, and absolutely inadmissible for the 
purposes of proving that Sam had made the statement. 
() 
' 
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(3) When Nancy Ahern testified to what Marilyn 
had told her Dr. Chapman had said Sam had said, this 
was double hearsay and absolutely inadmissible under any 
theory of law ever recognized in all of English and American 
Jurisprudence, including all of Ohio Jurisprudence in every 
case before and since this most special Sheppard case. 
The view of the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained by any stretch 
of juridicial reasoning. By indicating that such testimony was ad-
missible to "prove that the statement was made" the Court apparently 
refers to the so-called verbal acts doctrine. This applies only when 
testimony of an utterance is offered not to prove the truth of the 
matter contained therein, but only that the utterance occurred. 
That Marilyn made such a statement is wholly irrelevant; the 
truth of her statement was wholly inadmissible and utterly pre-
judicial. 
Nor was this evidence in any sense competent as proof of 
the "state of mind of the parties." It did not prove any state of 
mind as to Marilyn; it could not prove any state of mind as to 
petitioner. The only proof of that state of mind would have been 
Dr. Chapman. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Dr. 
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Chapman's testimony was requested by the prosecutor, or that his 
deposition was sought. 
We will not belabor the point by thrashing out each of the 
assigned errors which, after "careful examination" was found 
to be lacking in prejudice. The two recited above are sufficient 
to prove the point. Bearing in mind that under the statute cited 
in Section III, supra, the admission of inadmissible evidence re-
quires a new trial whenever it "may have been11 prejudicial to the 
defendant, we are unwilling to accept the fact that the Supreme Court 
actually overruled exceptions of this gravity. We know that counsel 
for respondent, however diligently they may search, will find no 
case in which some other Ohio Court has cited the Sheppard case 
in approving lie-detector evidence or double hearsay; this can only 
be because these "rules" are not rules at all, but only a means of 
sustaining a conviction whose maintenance became a statewide 
project. Sheppard was in effect afforded very limited review, or 
no review at all, by a court which had granted him an appeal as of 
right. He was manifestly denied, in a very real sense, the equal 
protection of the laws. His restraint is constitutionally invalid. 
He is entitled to release. 
::,1 
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CONCLUSION 
With these contentions, petitioner submits to the Court 
his entitlement to relief. He well realizes that he is asking a 
District Judge to overrule all of the state courts in a celebrated 
and controversial case, and that the responsibility thus imposed 
is indeed grave. However, it is sincerely suggested that cases of 
the type herein depicted are the very root of the justification for 
the supervisory role into which Federal District Judges have been 
cast. 
It is admittedly difficult to define just what is meant by 
the term "due process of law," and to ascertain where its limits 
have been transgressed. No one has ever been able to satisfactorily 
interpret this term into a foreign language, principally because no 
other country has ever nurtured this precise concept. It is unique. 
It is the strength of this country. 
There have been some expressions of due process by our 
Supreme Court, and these are worthy of note, even if they are 
principally in negative terms. 
"· . an arbitrary and unreasonable requirement so 
inconsistent with the established modes of administering 
justice that it amounts to a denial of due process. 11 Owenbey 
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 103. 
rf ,. 
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11 
•• convictions cannot be brought about by methods 
that offend 'a sense of justice! 111 Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165, 173. 
11 
•• some principle of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
• 
as fundamental. 11 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105. 
11 Representing profound attitude of fairness between 
man and man, and more particularly between man and govern-
ment, 'due process' is compounded of history, reason, the 
past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength 
of the democratic faith which we profess. Due process is 
not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process 
of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment 
by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding 
of the process. 11 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163. 
With only these very broad guidelines, this Court is required by 
the Supreme Law of the Land to now exercise a wholly independent 
judgment on each question of federal law raised by these issues, 
giving no deference to what state judges may have ruled on federal 
questions. Townsend v. Sain, supra, Petitioner subn1its that in 
each of these issues he has a substantial claim that his constitutional 
rights have been violated; but that taking them all together, as they 
here appear, the accretion of error is so great and so contrary to 
that fundamental fairness "implicit in a concept of ordered liberty" 
that relief is more than warranted. 
It is long overdue. 
Samuel H. Sheppard 
By his attorneys, 
F. Lee Bailey 
Benjamin L. Clark 
Russell A. Sherman 
